Pakistan Army does not resuscitate retired Chiefs. The nation has no place for a military dictator forced to resign. So Musharraf era is history. But its four major legacies have left Pakistan in a mess.

Pakistan is facing its most serious internal security crisis due to Jehadi terrorists encouraged by Musharraf despite 9/11. He used his cosiness with Bush Administration to re-engage Taliban as a proxy force in Afghanistan. Pakistani Taliban have now joined hands with Al Qaeda and developed their own political agenda. They control all seven tribal agencies in FATA and have spread across the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). They are targeting Islamabad as shown by Lal Masjid episode, attempts on Musharraf’s life, assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and the 20/9 Mariott Hotel blast. The possibility of their joining hands with Punjabi and Kashmiri extremist groups can not be ruled out.

Musharraf’s short sighted policies have led to Pakistan losing much of its territorial sovereignty. The rising tide of radical Islamic militancy threatens to tear the country asunder.

Pakistan is in the throes of an economic meltdown. Foreign exchange reserves have halved in the past three months to less than US$8 billion. Inflation runs at 25 percent. Power shortages cripple industry and agriculture. Massive unemployment fuels a resentful populace, one-third of which lives below the poverty line. There are street demonstrations in cities against inflation and load-shedding. While the military spends twice the amount spent on health and education, Pakistan is back at the door of the International Monetary Fund with a begging bowl to cure its ailing economy.

The economic problems have been exacerbated by an uneasy political transition, which has yet to gain the confidence of the Pakistan people. In self interest, Musharraf played the divide and rule game in Pakistani politics and ensured that no genuine leader could rise. In the last general election, his own party got decimated. Parties that emerged at the top are not only ideologically different but also more regional than national in character. The ruling Pakistan People’s Party has a support base in three smaller provinces of Sind, Baluchistan and NWFP. But Punjab, with 65 percent of the country’s 160 million people, is run by rival Nawaz Sharif. Pakistani politics is a much weaker institution today and its ethnic and sectarian cleavages stand widened.

Musharraf joined the US war on terrorism but ran with the hare and hunted with the hounds. In the end, he fell between two stools. Pakistan has re-emerged as the epicentre of Jehadi terrorism with a tattered international image. Despite strong dislike for US policies within Pakistan, it has to put up with severe US pressures because neither the US forces (in Afghanistan) can afford to lose logistics lifeline passing through North-West Pakistan nor can Pakistan lose economic, military and diplomatic support of the USA.

The Musharraf era has left Pakistan more vulnerable and more dependent on the Pakistan Army. Will the weak Zardari Government be able to cope up with these challenges that threaten the very existence of Pakistan? If it succeeds, it will be a miracle. If it fails, we will remember the graffiti that appeared on a Karachi wall in August 1990: ‘we apologise for this temporary democratic interruption. Normal martial law will be resumed shortly.’